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I. INTRODUCTION

I'm going to ask my friend to envision a world in which a
terrorist thug and/or a host nation might have the ability to
develop-and deliver a weapon of mass destruction via a-via
[sic] a rocket .... At the very least, it should be in our nation's
advantage to determine whether we can shoot it down. And we
are restricted from doing that because of an ABM treaty that was
signed during a totally different era. The case cannot be
even-the case is more strong today than it was on September
1Oth that the ABM is outmoded, outdated and reflects a different
time.'
It is clear from the words of the president of the United States, George W.
Bush, as he addressed the nation and the world on October 11, 2001, that the
United States intends to-at the very least--develop and test a missile defense
shield. This shield, if deployed, would protect all of the United States from the
threat of incoming nuclear weapons.'
The world is an entirely different place since the terrorist attacks on
September 11,2001 with a renewed threat from rogue nations and groups. The
state of missile defense is also different-it is now on an accelerated,
deliberate and well-defined course of action.' Missile defense is not a new
idea. What is new, however, is the current Bush administration's intensified
push for not only the development but also the deployment of a missile defense
shield that would protect all of the United States.' This invigorated attempt is
spurred on by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
City and on the Pentagon in Northern Virginia.5 Even political foes of

' President George W. Bush, Televised Address to the Nation (Oct. 11, 2001), at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011 -7.htnid#ABM-Treaty.
' Department of Defense, How Missile Defense Works FactSheet, Department of Defense
Electronic Library, athttp://www.defenselink.niVspecials/missiledefense/nnd.html (last visited
Oct. 14,2001).
- The White House, ABM TreatyFactSheet,at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/12/print/20011213-2.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2001).
4 Bill Gertz, Rumsfleld orderstests limited to comply with ABM Treaty, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4165141 (noting that the Bush administration's policy on
missile defense diverged sharply from the policy of the Clinton administration, who opposed a
missile defense system in order to preserve the ABM Treaty).
5 President Bush, supra note I (stating that "the world faces a different threat after
September 11, 2001 ").
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President Bush, who had previously opposed missile defense, seem to be

reconsidering their position in light of these terrorist attacks.6 This dramatic
push for a national missile defense system creates a new and urgent need to
reexamine the ABM Treaty and United States missile defense.
The dilemma that has enveloped the missile defense issue arises from the
ABM Treaty of 1972. This Treaty specifically prohibits the deployment of any

missile defense system.7 How to amend, interpret or withdraw from the Treaty

is the subject of great debate between the president, Congress and the world!
Now, the debate is much more focused-the Bush administration has said it
will end the Treaty if no settlement can be reached in order to develop and
deploy a missile defense shield over the United States irregardless of its

effectiveness against the type of terrorism that occurred on September 11,
2001.' As the world waits to see what the next phase will be in the United
States' war on terrorism, the world is left to ponder how a post-ABM Treaty
world will function."0
This Note will, in light of current missile defense efforts, consider the
available options for ending the United States' commitment to the Treaty:
breach, amendment or withdrawal. The author will attempt to determine which
option for dealing with the Treaty is preferred through the consideration of
potential responses the United States should expect from each of its proposed
actions. The Note will analyze self defense and reprisal, possible responses
from the International Court of Justice, and the potential repercussions in the
international arena in considering the recommended course of action for the
United States.

'See id. (pointing out that Senator Levin (D-Michigan, Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee) has recently dropped legal provisions curbing missile defense development in light
of the September I Ith attacks), and compare with Richard Norton-Taylor article, infra note 57,
at 59 (highlighting strong Democratic opposition to the Bush administration's missile defense
proposal).
' Antiballistic Missile Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435
[hereinafter ABA Treaty]. Article IV outlines the prohibitions as established by the terms of the
Treaty.
' Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Missile Defense: Who Terminates a Treaty? 57 BuLL. ATOM.
SCIENTIsTs 38 (Nov. 1, 2001), at 2001 WL 12676533.
' See Gerry J. Gilmore, Cold War Deterrents 'No Longer Enough' Bush Says, AMERICAN
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, athttp://www.defenselink.nil/news/May2001/n05022001-_200105021.

html (May 2, 2001). President Bush outlines the how and why ofa new missile defense program
during a speech at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Id.
'0See U.S. Sec. of State Colin Powell, NBC News: Meet the Press (Dec. 16,2001), at 2001
WL 24103599.
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I. THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

Signed May 26, 1972 as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT)," the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has shaped three decades of
United States defense and international arms policy. The 1964 SALT process
formally began in November 1969 after President Johnson proposed freezing
strategic offensive and defensive weapons.'" The result of the SALT I process
was the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms.
To understand the contemporary fury surrounding the seemingly certain U.S.
withdrawal, breach or amendment of the Treaty, it is critical to understand the
basis for the Treaty.
A. HistoricalBasisfor the ABM Treaty
The Treaty, signed during the height of the Cold War, focused on reducing
the number of nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Arsenal.' 3
The Treaty is based on the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)."'
Behind MAD was the idea that if either nation attacked the other, the attacking
nation would be doomed because of certain retaliation.'" While both nations
maintained the ability to counter an attack, neither had the power to counter a
counter-attack. Thus, according to the theory of MAD, neither country would
start a nuclear war that ensured their destruction. 6
MAD, as the cornerstone of the ABM Treaty, was thought to ensure
protection for both superpowers. 7 MAD would lose its effectiveness,
however, if either nation had the ability to defend against an incoming missile
strike."S Moreover, if the Soviets were aware of the United States' ability to
ABM Treaty, supra note 7; see also infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
Kevin C. Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty
and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854, 857-58 (1986).
" See David Edward Grogan, Power Play. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, National
Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 799, 803 (1999).
"4See William A. Kinsel, The Role of Arms Control in Strategic Nuclear Doctrine: SDI,
MAD, and the ABM Treaty, 62 WASH. L. REv. 763 (1987).
'sId.
,Id. ("The key, though, was that each side had to be able to retain a sufficient retaliatory
capacity to destroy the other side in the event of a preemptive first strike. If both sides retained
such a capability, neither side had an incentive to attempt a first strike."); see also Ivan Eland,
Abrogation of the ABM Treaty, 4 NEXUS 59 (1999).
1 Kinsel, supra note 14.
38 See Eland, supra note 16, at 59 ("But if the United States built a defensive ABM system,
"

32 See
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thwart an attack, they would develop offensive missile forces that could
penetrate the United States' missile defense system. 9 This never-ending,
dangerous and expensive cycle was the reason the ABM Treaty was created
and signed by the two nuclear Superpowers of the Cold War, as "the ABM
Treaty was originally adopted to enhance nuclear stability."2
The ABM Treaty specifically states that "[e]ach party undertakes not to
develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, airbased or mobile land-based."'" Article IIdid allow each country to deploy
one ABM system within 150 kilometers of their capital city and one other
system; but neither system could protect the entire nation.'
The Missile defense proposal of the George W. Bush administration seems
to violate the terms of the ABM Treaty.2" For much of the last twenty years,
political and defense leaders have searched for ways to creatively interpret or
maneuver around the ABM Treaty; this is no longer the case as the current
Bush administration ended the ABM Treaty to pursue Missile defense. 2'
In light of an assured deployment of missile defense, as proposed by the
Bush Department of Defense, the author will attempt to analyze the options for
dealing with the ABM Treaty: violation or breach, withdrawal, or amendment.
The author will not attempt to determine whether the president or Congress has
the constitutional authority to make or prevent such a decision.

the Soviet Union's second strike capability might be called into question.").
19Id.
20 Id. at 61 (quoting Dr. Henry Kissinger on his understanding and reasoning of the ABM
Treaty).
21 ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. V § 1.
" See Eland, supra note 16, at 61. This provision was later amended in 1974 to allow each
nation to deploy only one ABM system, still limited by the restriction of the site not protecting
the entire country or containing more than 100 missile interceptors and warheads. See also id.,
art.3.
1 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Prepared Statement for the House Armed
Services Committee Hearing on Ballistic Missile on Thursday July 18, 2001, at http://www.
defenselink.mil/speeches/2001 /s20010719-depsecdefl.html (last visited Sept. 7,2002); see also
ABM Treaty arts. 3, 5, 6.
24 White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Briefing Reporters at the White House (Aug.
3,200 1) (transcript availableat 2001 WL 21896815). "He (the President) is prepared to move
beyond the ABM Treaty, because it is the responsibility of the President to protect the American
people .

. . .";

see also Barry Schweid, US Quits Treaty in Favor of Missile Defense,

HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Dec. 14, 2001, at A05, availableat 2001 WL 31857904.
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B. Violation or Breach of the ABM Treaty
A treaty is a contract between nations. 5 Even though treaties are not
specifically governed by private contract law, contract custom still applies
requiring that parties are to act in good faith.' The subject of good faith is a
cornerstone of international law such that all countries and parties to treaties
are expected to uphold this basic principle." Good faith adherence to the
terms of agreement has long plagued the ABM Treaty as every U.S. administration has tried to creatively interpret the Treaty rather than adhere strictly to
the Treaty's terms.rs
The current situation of impending ABM Treaty violation is quite similar
to the situation of the suspected Soviet "breakout" in the early 1980's-a
technological advancement in weaponry and the subsequent deployment of that
weaponry will violate the terms of the Treaty. 9 To proceed with the current
proposal without giving notice of withdrawal is 'breaking out' of the Treaty
and is the equivalent of a breach of contract or a violation of the terms of
agreement." Legally this is a possibility and could be considered an option
that is preferable to withdrawing from the Treaty. 3 It may be that the United

' John Yoo, Politicsas Law?: The Anti-BallisticMissile Treaty, the SeparationofPowers,
and Treaty Interpretation,89 CAL L. REv. 851, 905 (2001).
" See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679,690 (highlighting the duty to carryout atreaty in good faith; the United States is not
a party to the Vienna Convention) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
' See Tariq Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty Formation, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1981)
(pointing out that good faith is an overriding principle of international law); see also U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, par. 2 (imposing a duty of good faith on the part of member nations; nations
have an obligation to "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by ther').
"' Grogan, supra note 13, at 867-68. The United States first brought good faith into
interpretation of the Treaty in 1983 when the Soviets were suspected of not adhering to the
Treaty in good faith; the U.S.S.R. was thought to be preparing to "breakout" of the Treaty by
installing Krasnoyarsk radar in Siberia. After the Reagan administration proposed the Star Wars
program, the U.S.S.R. objected to the reinterpretation of the Treaty by the administration to
"allow for" the continuation of the Star Wars proposal. Id.
29Id.
'oABM Treaty, supranote 7, art. XV (allowing each nation the option for withdrawing from
the Treaty by giving six months notice to the other party ifextraordinary events havejeopardized
the supreme interests of the withdrawing nation).
' Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, TheABM Treaty andthe President'sDecisionNot
to Deploy NMD, Department of Defense Electronic Library, at http://www.defenselink.mil/
specias/missiledefense/history4.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002) (noting that the Russian
response to an amendment or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be to scrap the entire arms
control structure, as the Russians view the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone agreement for the
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States can breach the Treaty and attempt to defend its actions by asserting that
the Treaty contract was 1) breached by earlier actions or 2) null and void.
1. The ABM Treaty-Breachedby an EarlierAction
In response to a United States breach of the ABM Treaty, a possible
defense may be that the Treaty was breached by earlier actions. The radar
system built by the U.S.S.R. in 1983 (Krasnoyarsk) may have breached the
Treaty and thus ended its life.32 Proving material breach is difficult, however,
absent blatant rejection of the terms of the contract.3 3 Furthermore, it is
unlikely that an act of the now defunct government of the U.S.S.R. some
eighteen years earlier would justify a current United States breach of the ABM
Treaty. 3' To give legitimacy to a breach by the United States in the international community, there would need to be an in independent action of one of
the Soviet successor states providing justification. 35 Because no recent action
of the Russian government has breached the ABM Treaty,36 it is not probable
that the United States government could adequately justify a breach of the
ABM Treaty by pointing only to an earlier, potential Soviet breach in 1983.
2. The ABM Treaty--Null and Void
A second option available to the United States government in pursuing
missile defense in breach of the ABM Treaty is to justify these actions by

arms control process).
32

See Donald G. Gross, Negotiated Treaty.Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty

Conflict, 28 HARv. INT'L L.J. 31 (1987).
" See Restatement (First) of the Law of Contracts §275 (1932) (listing six factors that
contribute to a finding of material breach); see also ROBERT A. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HuiWAN, CONTRACT & RELATED OBUGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE & PRACTICE 839 (3d ed.
1997) (noting there is no single touchstone of material breach, that many factors are involved

and that material breach is hard to prove).
'4See Gross, supra note 32, at 31 (stating that the Soviet action of building a radar system
to track missiles was not enough to justify a potential United States breach of the ABM Treaty
in 1987 and so the 1983 Soviet action would not justify a current breach).
35Id. at31.
"See Jim Garamone, Russia, UnitedStates Must Get Beyond Cold War, Rumsfield Says to
Putin, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 14,2001, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Aug200l/nO8142001200108142.html.
The Russian Defense Minister Seregy Ivanov's
response to the American request to mutually pull out of the ABM Treaty with "Ithink not"
reaffirming the continuing Russian commitment to the Treaty in stark contrast to any action that
would potentially breach the Treaty.
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asserting that the ABM Treaty is null and void due to a change in circumstance. Treaties are contracts in international law. 7 Contracts become null
and void when the circumstances underlying the contract change completely.38
Within the idea that a change in circumstance releases the United States
government from the ABM Treaty of 1972, there are two possibilities for
finding a change in circumstance so drastic that a breach of the Treaty by the
United States is allowable: the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. into states, or the
end of MAD (the underlying premise of the Treaty) with the end of Soviet
nuclear threats.
a. The Dissolution of the U.S.S.R.
On Christmas Day 1991, the Soviet Union ended. 3 Fifteen independent
states emerged to take the place of the U.S.S.R.' ° In contract law, performance
of a contract is impossible and the contract ends when a party to the contract
disappears.4" The ABM Treaty had been an agreement between the United
States and the Soviets-did it end when one of the parties ceased to exist?
International law does not recognize that a change in government alters a
state's obligations under treaty commitments, 42 but this was more than a
change in government within a state; rather, fifteen completely new states
emerged. The previous Bush administration undertook a review of all treaties
with the U.S.S.R. to see which should be upheld43 and the Clinton administration followed with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)." This review
Yoo, supra note 25.
38 See infra note 4 1.
37

3' Dr. Donald R. Baucom, Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History, Ballistic Missile

Defense Organization, at http://www.acq.osd.n-l/bmdo/bmdolink/htmllorigins.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2001).
40 Yoo, supra note 25, at 903.

See Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863) ("[I]n contracts in which the
performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is
implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing
shall excuse the performance.").
"

See Yoo, supra note 25, at 904.
See Edwin D. Williamson & John E. Osborn,A US. Perspectiveon TreatySuccession and
Related Issues in the Wake ofthe Breakup ofthe USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J.INT'L L. 261,
42
'3

267 (1993).
"Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems of May 26, 1972, Sept. 26, 1997, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/
missdef/abmtmou.html [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
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and MOU are direct evidence of earlier recognition of the new states that
emerged from the break-up of the U.S.S.R. and therefore render present
assertion of the Treaty as null and void more difficult to accept. Nevertheless,
within international law, the "clean slate" theory serves to free new states from
the agreements made by their predecessors."' This theory, if recognized as
law, would not bind the new states by the treaties of the former U.S.S.R.-thus

making the ABM Treaty void.
The fact that the four new states that have possession of the nuclear arsenal
of the former Soviet Republic (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) have
expressly assumed the responsibility of the ABM Treaty is likely to prevent a
justified United States breach of the Treaty.' In the international community,
it is accepted that the new states, Russia especially, intend to be bound by the
ABM Treaty.47 Another factor that points toward the continuation of the ABM
Treaty is Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, which maintains the obligations
of treaties entered into by a prior State unless the other parties agree to release
the new states, or if the continued application of the treaty would be incompatible with the objective of the conditions of the treaty.4 s The United States did
not release the four states of the former Soviet Republic that now have the
nuclear arsenal; in contrast, the MOU of the Clinton administration specifi-

41 See Yoo, supra note 25, at 905-06 (noting that the clean slate theory exists in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States and within Article 16 of the
Vienna Convention, but that the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention and that
the Restatement is not an authoritative statement on international law).
" Vienna Convention, supra note 26 (providing in Article 24 that if the parties agree,
expressly or by conduct, to continue a bilateral treaty, than an exception is made to the general
rule that prevents continuation of a treaty by a new state); see also Yoo, supra note 25, at 905
(stating that there is an exception to the clean slate rule in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States that allows a treaty to continue to bind a new state if the new
state accepts the terms of the treaty. This is also an exception to the Vienna Convention).
"' See John Issacs, Talking Points on the Case Against the ABM Treaty, 4 NEXUS 93
(1999).
Russia explicitly assumed the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union.
On January 29, 1992, shortly after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union,
Russian President Boris Yelstin said, Russia regards itself as the legal
successor to the USSR in the field of responsibility for fulfilling international
obligations. We confirm all obligations under bilateral and multilateral
agreements in the field of arms limitations and disarmament which were
signed by the Soviet Union and are in effect at present.

Id.
"

Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 34.
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cally recognized the continuation of the ABM Treaty.4 9 Prior acts of inclusion,
combined with no specific act of termination, are likely to keep the ABM
Treaty in continued existence. The Treaty is not null and void due to the
dissolution of the Soviet Republic since recognition by the United States and
new post-Soviet states have substantiated its continued existence since 1991.
b. End of MAD, Soviet Nuclear Threat
It is well established that the purpose of the ABM Treaty was to stabilize
nuclear relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R."1 President
Nixon undertook the SALT process to slow the nuclear arms race, and the
ABM Treaty was developed for that purpose."' Furthermore, the ABM Treaty
codified MAD.52 If treaties are contracts between nations, then when the
purpose ofthe contract is completely frustrated does the treaty cease to exist?53
It is clear that MAD was the foundation of the ABM Treaty, the purpose of
which was to stabilize relations by preventing nuclear missile stockpiling along
with a possible nuclear attack; neither party contemplated extinguishing either
their own nation or that of the other party.' Although MAD is no longer
viable and an event---the end of the U.S.S.R.--has prevented specific
performance of the Treaty, the purpose of the Treaty remains intact. It is still
possible to prevent nuclear attack between the United States and the former
Soviet Republics and maintain a stable, secure nuclear situation as a continuing goal of all the nations involved." Stable nuclear relations, as sought by
President Nixon at the outset of the ABM Treaty, remains the purpose. Thus,
complete frustration of purpose has not occurred due to a change in the
circumstance of the status of either nation's nuclear ability.'

49

Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 44.

See Eland, supranote 16 (quoting Dr. Kissenger's thoughts concerning the ABM Treaty).
s' See Missile Defense Milestones, infranote 87.
52 Grogan, supra note 13, at 806.
" Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (K.B. 1903) (outlining the frustration of purpose doctrine by
considering the foundation of the contract, prevention of performance and whether the event that
prevented performance was in contemplation of the parties-contemplation would prevent
frustration of purpose).
See Baucom, supra note 39.
SSSee Global Business, Why Not Accept Russia Into NATO?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 21,
2001, available at 2001 WL 25755027.
56 See Carla Ann Robbins & Andrew Higgins, Bush Plans How to Exit the ABM Treaty,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at A16 (noting that Russia and United States are considering large
'o

cuts in the numbers of offensive weapons kept by both nations in ongoing arms talks).

2002]

LEGAL OPTIONS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

The missile defense plan proposed by the current Bush administration is
touted as protection against rogue nations and terrorist groups." This new
threat is a significant change in circumstance-from the communist U.S.S.R.
to rogue nations. In a summer 2001 briefing, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz outlined how drastically different the world is today as compared
with 1972.5" The Bush administration has repeatedly pointed to North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq as examples of nations that pose the greatest threat and,
therefore, justification for the deployment of a missile defense shield. 9
The purpose of the ABM Treaty, stabilizing nuclear relations, does not
appear to be consistent with this new outlined threat in that, as opposed to the
situation with the U.S.S.R., here the Administration is not seeking arms
limitations talks with rogue nations', rather they are simply seeking to protect
the American nation.' However real and justified this 21st century threat may
be in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it is outside the existing
relationship with the former Soviet Republics. While this new threat may
justify separate action and defense, it does not frustrate the purpose of
stabilizing nuclear relations with Russia. This drastic change in circumstance,
due to the emergence of new enemies of the United States may justify
withdrawal from the Treaty to protect United States safety. However, the
purpose of stabilizing nuclear relations with Russia is still a cornerstone of
United States policy."

" Richard Norton-Taylor, The MADness of PresidentGeorge: The Bush administration's
decision to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has put the British government in a
dificultposition,GUARDIAN (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1,2001, availableat 2001 WL 25731914
(quoting President Bush's address at the National Defense University by noting that the

proliferation of ballistic missile technology is "in the hands of states for whom terror and
blackmail are a way of life").
58 See Wolfowitz, supra note 23 (stating specifically that in 1972 the number of biological
weapons programs was unknown, whereas today there are thirteen; ten countries had chemical
weapons programs, and today there are sixteen; five countries had nuclear weapons programs,
while today there are twelve; nine countries had ballistic missiles, and today there are twenty
eight).
s9 See id.
6 See Robbins & Higgins, supra note 56 (realizing this is significantly different from the
relationship with the U.S.S.R. and now Russia where arms limitations talks continue to be
common).

6' Presidents Putin and Bush, News Conference at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Leader's Summit in Shanghai, China (Oct. 21, 2001) (transcript at http://msnbc.com/news/
645662.asp) (giving evidence of continued United States-Russian arms negotiations--quoting
Putin, "[W]e affirmed our mutual intention to reduce strategic offensive weapons," and quoting
Bush, "[B]oth our nations are working to prevent proliferation and to reduce the threat from
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C. Amendment of the ABM Treaty
As written, the terms of the ABM Treaty make clear that amendment is
possible. 2 An amendment that would allow the proposed missile defense
program to proceed would drastically alter the Treaty since the aim of the
Treaty was to prevent construction of antiballistic missile defense systems in
an effort to stabilize the arms race. Nonetheless, while it may seem radical,
this type of amendment is an option for the Bush administration to consider for
two reasons: 1) precedent shows that the Treaty has been successfully
amended to accommodate drastic changes, and 2) the ABM Treaty is just a
part of an overlapping arms limitation structure that is subject to continual
amendment and revision.3
1. PriorSuccessful Amendment as Precedent
Historically speaking, amending the ABM Treaty is not an impossibility as
it has been done twice.' These two previous amendments serve as a backdrop
for a potential amendment to allow for the construction of a missile defense
system. This amendment, however, would be more extreme than the previous
amendments.
In 1974, just two years after signatures were affixed, the ABM Treaty was
amended. 5 While this amendment did not change the purpose of the Treaty,
the amendment decreased the number of defense sites each country was
allowed to maintain, thus making a significant change.' With this change, the
United States protected the missile defense site at Grand Forks, North Dakota,
and the U.S.S.R. protected their capital at Moscow."
The second amendment to the ABM Treaty happened more recently. When
the Soviet Union disbanded in late 1991, the Treaty was amended to allow for
Cold War stockpiles throughout the former Soviet Union").
' ABM Treaty, supra note 7 art. XIV(1) ("Each Party may propose amendments to this
Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing
the entry into force of this Treaty.").
I3 See Rupert Cornwell, Bush Gives Russians Until November to Agree on Missile Shield,
Aug. 23, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 23547365.

INDEPENDENT (London),

" Eland, supranote 16, at 61.
6Id. (noting that the ABM Treaty was amended in 1974 to allow each nation one
installation site containing local defenses; the Treaty originally allowed each nation two
installation defense sites).
"Id.
67 Baucom, supra note 39.
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Russia (and other states) to succeed Soviet responsibility." This amendment
is more drastic than the first, as the Treaty went from a bilateral agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union to a multilateral agreement69
that now includes five nations.70 Bilateral treaties are contracts between
nations. Adding four states to replace the former Soviet Union changed the
nature of the Treaty dramatically as it is now an agreement between the United
States and four nations and among the other four nations themselves.7 ' Any
possible amendment to allow the Bush missile defense system would be within
the existing framework, but would change the Treaty's entire focus, which was
the prevention of construction of missile defense systems to protect an entire
country.

While there is a history of amending the ABM Treaty, this amendment is
unlikely to occur. The Bush administration has stated that it intends to move
beyond the Treaty72 and that simply amending the Treaty does not move
beyond, but rather gives validity to the idea of maintaining the Treaty through
the amendment process.
The recent summit between President Bush and President Putin suggests
that negotiation is more likely than amendment. Speaking with President Putin
at a news conference, President Bush announced drastic cuts in the United
States nuclear arsenal.7" Even with this significant milestone in United
States/Russian arms relations, no agreement was reached on missile defense
due to striking differences as to how to make missile defense work in
conjunction with the ABM Treaty.7' Treaty amendment seems highly unlikely
" Eland, supranote 16, at 61 (pointing out that, "more recently the Treaty was renegotiated
to reflect the demise of the Soviet Union").
69 See George K. Walker, Source oflnternationalLawandthe Restatement (Third), Foreign
Relations Law of the United States 37 NAVAL L. REv. 1, 16 (1988) ("A multilateral convention

contemplates that more than two nations will be bound by its terms... Bilateral treaties are, as
the name implies, negotiated between only two nations and bind only those two nations."). Id.
70 Eland, supranote 16, at 61-62 (pointing out that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan
have now assumed the ABM obligations of the former U.S.S.R.).
"' Id. at 62 (noting that neither recognizing Russia or the four states as the ABM successor
would preserve the full original purpose and substance of the Treaty).
I Wolfowitz, supra note 23 ("[T]his administration does not intend to violate the ABM
Treaty; we intend to move beyond it.").
" Jeanne Cummings & Carla Anne Robbins, Bush, Putin Pledge to Cut NuclearArms, but
Divisions Remain Sharp, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A24, available at 2001 WL-WSJ

29677882. Bush announced that the United States would reduce the United States nuclear
stockpile by two-thirds, lowering the total number of long-range missile to between 1,700 and
2,200. Russia had earlier agreed to reduce their arms level to around 1,500 missiles. Id.
I Laurence McQuillian & Bill Nichols, Bush-Putintalks highlight continuingdifferences;
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as an agreement would be required before an amendment is possible. While
both nations appear ready to negotiate, neither nation is ready to compromise
and reach consensus.
2. Arms Limitation Structure PermitsAmendment
The ABM Treaty was part of the SALT I process, so that on the day the
Treaty was signed it was actually one of two agreements made official.75 The
ABM Treaty is just one piece of the arms limitation puzzle;76 perhaps the most
persuasive evidence of this is the existence of the SALT II process and
subsequent agreements. 7
The Bush administration has repeatedly stated that the ABM Treaty is out
of date, while maintaining that arms reductions talks between Russia and the
United States are ongoing. 7 Because the ABM Treaty is only one agreement
among many that govern arms control, it may be possible to amend one treaty
(the ABM Treaty) and not disrupt the entire balance of nuclear stability.
It is, however, unlikely that the United States will be able to amend the
ABM Treaty to sufficiently accommodate the missile defense plan proposed
by the Bush administration. 79 Notably, the international community is strongly

Neithernation hasfiguredout how to keep missiledefense treaty inforce while ignoringit, USA
TODAY, Nov. 14, 2001, at A 10, availableat 2001 WL 5476286. "The general tone is great, but
the devil is in the details." Id.
7' See Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, BMDO Timeline (Oct. 14,2001), Department
of Defense Electronic Library, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/timeline.pdf. In
September 1980 the Soviet Union fully deployed the SS-18 missile, which the United States
analysts conclude gives the Soviets a first strike capability because of the 10 extremely accurate,
high yield warheads per missile. Id.
7 See Mary Dejevsky, USto Offer PutinAid in ReturnforDealon Star Wars, INDEPENDENT
(London), May 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17887082. "Russia says that it (the ABM
Treaty) is the basis for all subsequent arms control treaties, and still has a purpose."; id. See also
History of Ballistic Missile Defense, The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, History of
Ballistic MissileDefense (Oct. 15, 2001), Department of Defense Electronic Library, at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/history.html (noting that the SALT process that produced
the ABM Treaty was the beginning of strategic arms reductions talks between the two nuclear
superpowers).
77 Id.
71 Wolfowitz, supra note 23; see also Cummings & Robbins, supra note 73.
" See The ABM Treaty and the President'sDecision not to Deploy NMD, supra note 31
("When the Clinton administration began its efforts to amend the Treaty, it met strong opposition
from the Russians, who protested that the Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability and
could not be amended.").

2002]

LEGAL OPTIONS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

opposed to the idea of amending the Treaty in such a way that the entire
purpose of the Treaty is circumvented.80 Earlier attempts to amend the ABM
Treaty to allow for the Star Wars plan under the Reagan administration were
not successful, and the same fate is likely for the current proposal." Amending
the ABM Treaty may theoretically be possible as the Treaty is only a small
piece of the arms control agreement process, but the amendment approach is
not viewed as practical" and is not well-received by anyone involved in the
process, neither in the United States nor Russia."
D. Withdrawalfrom the ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty itself holds the most obvious method for moving beyond
the terms ofthe Treaty-withdrawal. Article XV specifically allows for either
country to withdraw unilaterally from the Treaty.8 All that is required for
withdrawal is six months notice and an accompanying "statement that explains
the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized

" Id. (noting that members of the international community including China, France and the
United Nations, supported Russian opposition to Treaty amendment); see also Pamela L.
Meredith, Comment: The Legality ofa High-TechnologyMissileDefense System: The ABMand
Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 421 (1984) (recalling that amending the ABM
Treaty was ruled out with the Star Wars proposal because the entire objective and purpose of the
Treaty were being questioned); see also Deborah Seward, Russia Welcomes UN. General
Assembly Vote in Support ofMaintainingABM Treaty, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Nov.
30, 2001. The General Assembly voted 84-5 with 62 abstentions in favor of maintaining the
Treaty, showing strong international support for the ABM Treaty. Id.
81see Gross, supra note 32, at 65-66 (noting that opponents of the Reagan administration's
SDI plan disliked the idea of amendment because it might allow for the wholesale development
and deployment of a space-based missile defense system to proceed. Proponents of the Reagan
SDI plan were also opposed to the amendment idea because they saw an amendment as a
possible Soviet veto power ofUnited States defense plans-before any initiative could be carried
out, Soviet approval through the amendment process would be necessary.).
'2 See Steven Mufson, Postponement Shows Shift in Priorities,WASH. POST, Oct. 26,2001,
availableat 2001 WL 29164804 (identifying that one major problem with amending/revising
the ABM Treaty would be what to name the new treaty-Bush would want the name to reflect
an end of the ABM Treaty, while Putin would want the name to show he salvaged the ABM
Treaty); see also Meredith, supra note 80, at 421 ("[A]mendment is ruled out in this case
since ...amendment would require the consent of both parties." This was a similar situation
faced during Star Wars program.).
83 Mufson, supra note 82. The idea of amending the ABM Treaty is opposed by many in
the Bush administration because they do not see the need for such a treaty since the United States
and Russia are no longer fierce enemies. Id.
" ABM Treaty, supranote 7, art. XV.
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its supreme interests."S However, withdrawal from the Treaty is not as simple
as giving notice. There are "certainjustifications for withdrawal that might not
be sufficient under international law."86 If the United States is to maintain
credibility in the international arena, and especially with the new Russian state,
any justification for withdrawal must be real and legitimate.
In the past, withdrawal has not been considered a viable option for the fear
of destabilizing relations between the United States and the former Soviet
Union.87 The fear of starting another arms race kept the United States as a
party to the Treaty." However, withdrawal could have been adequately
justified during Reagan's SDIprogram;" and so, the events of September 11th,
2001 and the new terrorism concerns likely allow withdrawal to be recognized
as adequate justification."
Withdrawal is an independent action; the Bush administration need not
consult with anyone other than U.S. officials and Congress (even the
requirement of this consultation is debatable).9' The justification for
withdrawal is at the discretion of the United States.92 While United States
withdrawal is not likely to meet a warm international reception, it may well be
the safest and most honest option for pursuing missile defense since it is not
possible to honor the Treaty and simultaneously pursue missile defense.93
Breaching or amending the Treaty do not appear to be legitimate options.

ss Id.
6
'

Kinsel, supra note 14, at 772 (noting withdrawal is not "trouble free").
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, HistoryofBallisticMissile Defense (Oct. 15,

2001), Department of Defense Electronic Library, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/
htnil/history.htnil.

" Angela M. Bradley, Opposing Interpretationsof an International Treaty: The AntiBallisticMissile Treaty Controversy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 295 (2001) (highlighting the basis for

both parties signing the Treaty during the height of the Cold War).
"9See Kinsel, supra note 14, at 773 ("As such, [the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar]
would meet the United States' international legal obligations for withdrawal under the specific
terms of the ABM Treaty.").
'o Stephen F. Cohen, Second Chance with Russia, NATION (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 5,
2001, availableat 2001 WL 2132977 (noting that the September I1th events have given the
United States a second chance at pursuing ABM negotiations with Russia).
9' Manual Perez-Rivas, USquitsABM Treaty,CNN.com(Washington, D.C.), Dec. 14,2001,
at http://www.cnn.com/200/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec.bush.abm/index.html.
9 See Meredith, supra note 80, at 421.

13 See Mufson, supranote 82 (reaffirming the fact that the ARM Treaty and missile defense
are mutually exclusive since the United States had to postpone tests of its missile defense system
to avoid violating the Treaty; this was done to continue progress that is being made between
Presidents Bush and Putin on the subject of missile defense).
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Regardless of which option is chosen (breach, amendment or withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty), the current U.S. pursuit of missile defense will "move
beyond" the ABM Treaty. One should consider possible responses to the
United States decision to pursue missile defense in an effort to make the most
informed decision on how or if to proceed.
Ill. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE
The United States has been a major player in the international arena since
World War H and, after the fall of the Soviet Union, has been perhaps the most
powerful nation on the globe. Even though it may not be possible for any
nation to match the military, economic or politic influence ofthe United States,
it is likely that there will be an international reaction to any United States
decision to end the ABM Treaty.94 Having been a part of international efforts
to punish other nations for treaty violations in the past, the United States must
expect that reaction will come from many sources.95 Possible reactions to the
United States' violation-in whatever form-of the ABM Treaty may include
forceful response, action in the International Court of Justice and international
backlash.
A. ForcefulResponse
If the United States is to deploy a missile defense system, nations that were
a party to what would then be a defunct ABM Treaty may feel threatened."
In response to this new threat, the United States ability to defend against

" See Elaine Lafferty, Bush SignalsDeterminationto Abandon ABM Treaty-Appointment
of GeneralMyers Seen as Victoryfor 'StarWars'Lobby, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 25,2001, available

at 2001 WL 25573054 (noting that there is vehement opposition to the missile defense plan
within NATO, Russia and China).
" See, e.g., Dylan A. MacLeod, InternationalConsequencesofNorway'sDecision to Allow
the Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling, 6 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 131 (1994). In one

example, the United States agreed to proposed trade sanctions on Norway for breaching the
moratorium on commercial whaling as imposed by the International Whaling Commission even
though the Commission's scientific body had approved limited whaling and Norway had
exercised tremendous conservation programs. Id.
" See Martin Kettle & Amelia Gentleman, US Defies Global Fury Over Missile Shield,

GUARDIAN (Washington, D.C.), July 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24850425 (Vladimir
Rushailo, the head of Mr. Putin's securitycouncil, said, "Russia, like many other countries, takes
the view that the US's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would lead to the destruction
of strategic stability, a new powerful spiral of the arms race...").
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incoming missiles, forceful reaction might be considered by those who would
then feel threatened (mainly Russia, but also including the three other
nations)." This forceful response would likely come in the form of anticipatory self-defense or reprisal.
1. Self-Defense
According to Swiss Lawyer E. de Vattel, "One's own defense against
unlawful assault is not only rightful, but an obligation of a nation, and one of
the most sacred.""0 More than two hundred years after this definition was
formulated, self defense is understood to be a common institution in international law, allowing nations to defend themselves when facing an imminent
threat."
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (U.N.) charter governs modem selfdefense: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations. " "tW The preeminent concern of the charter of the U.N. is the
promotion of international peace.'' Any self-defense action taken must be
proportional to the action to which it responds." An armed attack is not
proportional to the deployment of a purely defensive missile defense system.0 3
The only way to justify self-defense in this modem era is to use force
consistent with the purposes of the U.N. so as to eliminate any conflict with
the strict prohibition of the use of force found in Article 2(4)."°4 The type of
"7See Deborah Seward, Russia welcomes U.N. General assembly vote in support of
maintainingAB M Treaty, ASsOCiATE PRESS NEwswnPES, Nov. 13,2001, available at AP WIRES
10:31:00.
91 EDMUND JAN OSMANCZYK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNA-

AGREEMENTS at 748 (1985).
" Id. at 749.
' U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 4; see also BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2
(Louis B. Sohn, ed., 1956) (outlining Article 2(4) of the United Nations' Charter).
,01 See Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms
Control Agreements: 'Star Wars' and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL 73, 122 (1985); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
"oId. International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion of the Legality of the Threat of Use
TIONAL

of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809.
203 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (noting
that self defense is governed inter alia by the principle of proportionality).
204 See Zedalis, supra note 101, at 85 (noting that the prevailing view of Article 2(4) is that
only the force that is expressly permitted elsewhere in the U.N. Charter is allowed under Article
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self-defense that is permitted under the auspices of the U.N. in response to the
deployment of a missile defense system would be anticipatory self-defense. 5
This is an action that is taken in expectancy of a direct armed attack." 6
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter speaks directly to the use of force in selfdefense, allowing the use of force only when "an armed attack occurs."'0 7 This
is not, however, the circumstance that would occur with the deployment of a
United States missile defense system, since there would be no armed attack.
In fact, the only time the United States missile defense would ever be activated
is if the United States itself were first attacked which would constitute
justifiable self-defense in its own right. The latest push to implement U.N.
resolutions allowing "nations' rights to individual and collective self defense"
speak directly to the use of force in response to armed attacks."' If the United
States violates the ABM Treaty, former Treaty members will have even less
of a right to a self-defense claim if they consider Articles 2(4) and 51 read in
conjunction with the peaceful settlement requirement of Article 2(3).19
While it appears certain that a right to self-defense exists under the U.N
Charter, the right does not exist if there is a moment for deliberation."0 This
negates any claim by former Treaty members since they all know of the
development and deployment of a missile defense system."' The right to self-

2(4)).
101Id.at 97 ("Thus, to justify the use of force against a perceived imminent threat of attack
or an action that threatens to create military instability, reference must be had to the doctrines

of anticipatory self-defense and self-help reprisal.").
'0 OSMANCZYK, supra note 98, at 749.
'o Zedalis, supra note 101, at 98.
'o See Edwin Chen, Response to Terror the Presidency: Bush, Putin Fail to Resolve
Argument Over Necessity'for 1972 Missile Treaty Summit, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at A16,
availableat 2001 WL 28922556 ("They (Bush and Putin) vowed to implement 'faithfully and

immediately' two U.N. Security Council resolutions reaffirming nations' rights to individual and
collective self defense. Bush has cited those resolutions to justify the current United States-led
campaign against Osarna Bin Laden, his followers in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime
there.").

"oSee Zedalis, supra note 101, at 103 ("When Articles 2(4) and 51 are read in conjunction
with Article 2(3), Article 2(3)'s requirement that '[a]ll members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means' suggests that forceful measures of dispute resolution are always
prohibited, unless inresponse to an actual armed attack'); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.
3.
"o See Zedalis, supra note 101.
". See id. at 154 ("Advance knowledge of a situation surely gives... more than a 'moment
of deliberation' and thus seems to require (the targeted state) to develop appropriate responses.").
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defense is not a right that is advocated or accepted 2 and is not a viable option
for members of the ABM Treaty that wish to remain in good international
standing after a probable United States violation of the Treaty.
2. Reprisal

A second option that may be available to members of the ABM Treaty in
response to United States violation of the Treaty is reprisal, or the retaliation
undertaken by one state in response to the illegal action of another state." 3
However, this option may not exist under international law as it was outlawed
after World War H and no longer recognized as legitimate by the international
community, especially for treaty violation.""
A clear, progressive development has emerged that bans the use ofreprisals
involving force in international law among all civilized nations."' In the case
of reprisals, when one nation is dissatisfied with the actions of another, the
dissatisfied nation responds with military action to force the other nation to act6
as the forceful nation wishes; this is contrary to international law, however."
An act of reprisal is not within the purposes of the U.N. and is not allowed
under any Article." 7 While the International Court of Justice has not banned
reprisals," 8 there has not been an action before the I.C.J. that has sanctioned
or approved of a reprisal action." 9 A reprisal for a violation of the ABM
Treaty is not therefore acceptable.

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), at 100
(noting that statements made by State representatives confirm the prohibition on force expressed
in Article 2(4); these statements recognize that the prohibition on force is a fundamental
principle of international law).
'13 See OsMANczYK, supra note
98.
"" See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11) (noting that the
Vienna Convention prohibits any form of reprisals in response to the breach of a treaty).
us Military and Paramilitary Activities (Hicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 153.
116Id. at 151.
' See Zedalis, supra note 101, at 121 ("[T]he only use of force by an individual state left
indisputably untouched... is the traditional right of self-defense.").
"' See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 103 (noting that
belligerent reprisals have not altogether been banned, but the dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeranantry laments not making an outright ban on reprisals as they are not accepted as lawful
112See

under customary international law).
"' See Zedalis, supra note 101, at 123 (noting that resolutions condemning reprisals were
issued thirteen times in the first twenty five years of UN existence).

2002]

LEGAL OPTIONS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

Reprisals, whether recognized or legal, are only permitted when a nation
acts in a prohibited manner.' ° If handled according to the terms of the Treaty,
a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is not an illegal act. Justified breaches of
the Treaty or an amendment to the Treaty are also legal actions. Reprisal
should not therefore be considered by members of the ABM Treaty 'as a
legitimate response to a United States violation of the Treaty that is within the
bounds of customary international law.
B. PotentialInternationalCourt of JusticeAction
Opening in 1946, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) reflects the
"main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world."''
Only a state that is a U.N. member (and Switzerland) may apply to be heard by
the I.C.J., and jurisdiction is limited to three situations.' 2 The ABM Treaty
contains no provision for submitting a dispute to the I.C.J.; therefore, the only
way that the I.C.J. could hear a case arising from an ABM Treaty dispute is if
the United States and the four former Soviet Republics agreed to submit the
dispute to the Court's jurisdiction.
The Court has traditionally refrained from hearing cases of a legal and
political nature,' and thus the courts reception of this emotional and political
dispute is highly unlikely. The Court could possibly issue a non-binding
advisory opinion used to facilitate discussion. 24 Yet another possible option
for states seeking jurisdiction before the Court is for a party to submit the issue
to the Chambers procedure.'25 This procedure gives the party control over the
size, expertise and composition of the Court. 26
Regardless of how the issue of a violation of the ABM Treaty would be
submitted to the Court, it is unlikely the Court would render a decision. The
ABM Treaty specifically provides for a Standing Consultative Commission

'2

OSMANCZYK, supra note 98.

International Court of Justice, ICI GeneralInformation-The Courtat a Glance(June 7,
2002), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformaton/icjgnnot.html.
11 Id. (stating that jurisdiction is possible (1)
when states choose to submit the dispute to the
court; (2) when there is ajurisdictional clause, i.e. a treaty or convention submits all disputes to
the I.C.J.; or (3) where there is a reciprocal declaration).
'"See MacLeod, supra note 95, at 133.
124 Id.
121

'2 Id. at 133.
126Id.
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(SCC), which is to govern and implement the provisions of the Treaty.'27
Having the SCC revise and interpret the Treaty will likely preclude the need
for a Court decision, as the I.C.J. deems that "it is the duty of the court to
interpret the treaties, not to revise them."'
In all likelihood, the United States would not choose to submit to the
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. 29 as the United States has repeatedly made it clear that
it intends to proceed with the proposed missile defense system. Even without
United States submission, it would be possible for the Court to render a
decision if there is jurisdiction and the case has a strong legal and factual
basis. 3 ' This, however, is not probable since any of the proposed methods for
moving beyond the ABM Treaty that are available to the United States have
a legal basis for action-especially withdrawal as it is provided for in the
Treaty itself. While theoretically a possibility, action by the I.C.J. is not a real
option since the jurisdiction is not provided for in the Treaty, the United States
is unlikely to submit to jurisdiction, probable United States action is not illegal
and the Court typically refrains from political issues.
C. InternationalBacklash
From even a small sampling of the international media, it is easy to
perceive that many in the world are unhappy with the United States' decision
to deploy a missile defense system.'' While it is unlikely that any nation will
pursue self-defense or reprisal, and action in the I.C.J. is improbable, there are
other ways nations can show their disapproval for United States policy.
The United Kingdom and Denmark are especially affected by a decision to
deploy missile defense, as these nations are home to two of the three existing
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Stations.'32 If terribly unhappy or dissatisfied,
,27ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. XIII.
128Interpretation ofPeace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary & Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 221,229
(July 18).
129 See Ben Fenton, US Presses Ahead with the 'Son of Star Wars', DAELY TELEGRAPH
(London), July 13, 2001, at P21, available at 2001 WL 24472348 (noting that the Bush

administration made it clear to European allies that missile defense would proceed, regardless
of "concern that the ABM Treaty had underpinned arms negotiations for more than a
generation").
1 MacLeod, supra note 95, at 133.
1
See Jeremy Stocker, NMD Dilemma, JANE's DEFENCE WEEKLY (Washington, D.C.), Vol.

36 Issue 8, Aug. 22, 2001, at 22, available at 2001 WL 4814508 ("Most European governments
and publics alike appear deeply skeptical of the need for such a system .. .
132 Id.
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with the United States which allow
these nations could revoke the agreements
33
for the existence of these structures.1
As it enters its third century of foreign policy, the United States' goal is to
maintain and develop good international relations with countries throughout
the world. Many have noted that violating international law by testing and
deploying missile defense is not the best way to win friends or gain
credibility.' 3 In the past, the United States has imposed sanctions or refused
3
to trade with nations that violate international law and treaty commitments.
Logic provides that the United States should expect a similar reaction from
others. 36 The greatest backlash will likely come from the Russians, who here
asserted that the United States is renewing the arms race. 37 This backlash
could force the United States to confront its relations with the world's only
other nuclear superpower without a single arms limitation agreement. 38 While
this is frightening to consider, it is unlikely that Russia would want to exist
without an arms agreement with the United States since it is Russia who has
a decayed arsenal and lacks the funds to repair or replace nuclear weapons.' 39
The United States may face trade restrictions, difficulty in making treaties, and
distrust or dislike from some. However, if the United States follows the

" See id. (noting, however, that the U.K. is not likely to take such action since their newly
appointed Secretary for the State of Defense is much more amenable to the idea of missile
defense than his predecessors have been).
" See A Startling Lack ofthe Vision Thing, CANBERRA TIMEs, Aug. 7, 2001, available at
2001 WL 26510109 (noting that it is acceptable for the United States to violate international law
in pursuit of its own national interests, but that it should be done in a way that offends the least
number). See also The Physiciansfor SocialResponsibilityBriefing,July 12, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 21895884 (stating that the Bush administration wants to pursue a missile defense
system even though it violates international law).
,'MacLeod, supra note 95. The United States imposed trade sanctions on Norway for not
following the whaling moratorium that was created and enforced by the International Whaling
Commission.
"' See Kettle & Gentleman, supra note 96. The head of the Russian Security Council stated
that "the international community should consolidate its efforts to prevent such developments"

(referring to the breach of the ABM Treaty by construction of United States missile defense).
Id.
See Big VictoryforPutin with START! but ProblemsRemain, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
...
Apr. 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2774482 (quoting the Russian daily Kommersant,
"Americans violate the ABM agreement... they (United States) will be the cause of the start of
a new arms race").
"I See ABM Treaty & President'sDecision Not to Deploy NMD, supra note 31 ("The
Russians now threatened to scrap the entire arms control structure if the United States insisted
on changing or withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.').
"' Robbins & Higgins, supra note 56.
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principle of good faith that overrides international law, most nations will
respect whatever decision the United States makes in the best interest of its
citizens.
IV. CONCLUSION

Prior to September 11, 2001, a missile defense shield was a campaign
promise of George W. Bush. After this now infamous date, missile defense
seems a necessity to keep Americans safe from the nuclear threat of rogue
nations and groups. The president has made clear that a thirty-year old ABM
Treaty will not constrain his plans to protect America.'"
With the decision made, the challenge now is in how best to end the U.S.
commitment to the ABM Treaty. Withdrawing, by giving six months notice
and a statement that clearly outlines the threat from rogue nations and groups
is honest, straightforward and follows the international law principle of good
faith negotiations. Complex arms talks and agreements have proven cumbersome and difficult to deal with, making the case for a clear withdrawal even
stronger.
Incentives to mitigate Russian opposition are possible.'" Compromises
have been suggested that change the face of international relations. 42 The
greatest incentive the United States government can give to Russia or any other
nation is an honest and clear answer on its policy. Russia has stated, "we are
partners" in referring to its new relationship with the United States, and to
continue this partnership and other partnerships, the United States should
openly and honestly withdraw from the ABM Treaty to pursue missile defense.
The events of September 11th have caused everyone to seriously consider the
threats from rogue nations and groups-missile defense is imminent. Selfdefense and reprisal actions are not likely and the I.C.J. has no direct
jurisdiction over the United States decision on missile defense. If the Bush

', See Wolfowitz, supra note 23 ("President Bush has also made clear that a 30 year-old
treaty designed to preserve the nuclear balance of terror during the Cold War must not be
allowed to prevent us from taking steps to protect our people, our forces and our allies.").
141 Mary Dejevsky, US to Offer Putin Aid in Returnfor Deal on Star Wars, INDEPENDENT
(London), May 29, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 17887082. The United States is prepared to
offer joint anti-missile exercises, buy Russian missiles and other trade and aid incentives to
compromise the package that is offered to Putin by the Bush administration. Id.
142 WhyNotAcceptRussia into NATO?, Bus. WLONLUNE, Sept. 21, 2001,availableat2001
WL 25755027. Proposed post Cold-War plans include offering NATO membership to Russia,
the former leader of NATO's greatest adversary, the Warsaw Pact. Id.
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administration is truly concerned with protecting America and its allies, an
honest withdrawal and acceptance of any international backlash is the best
policy.
America's greatest patriot, George Washington, said, "[T]o be prepared for
war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." To prepare for
war, the United States seems ready to develop and deploy a missile defense
shield, but to preserve the peace, the United States should use good faith and
honesty in its international obligations and withdraw from the ABM Treaty
rather than attempt to justify a breach or undertake a cumbersome amendment
procedure.' 43

", President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense (Dec.
13,2001), athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2001/12/printl2001213-4.html. President
George W. Bush announced to the world on Dec. 14, 2001 that the United States was giving the
required six months notice of its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The president
cited new threats from terrorists and rogue nations along with the difficulties of amending or
breaching the Treaty as the reasons for withdrawing. He also noted that withdrawal from the
Treaty was the best legal option and the best option for continuing relations with Russia and the
rest of the world. Since this announcement, there has been little international backlash. The six
months required for notification have come and gone and it seems as though honesty was the
best policy.

